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A Comparison of the Stock Market Reactions of Convertible Bond Offerings between 
Financial and Non-Financial institutions: Do they differ?
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Abstract 
We focus on the stock price reaction to convertible bond offering made by financial 
institutions and find that the cumulative abnormal return over the three day interval around 
convertible bond issuance is 1.41 percentage higher than that for non-financial institutions. 
This result supports our hypothesis that since financials are heavily regulated, the market is 
less likely to assume that the issuance of convertible bond by financials signals information 
that are overvalued. Our results remain robust after controlling for a number of firm-, issue-, 
and market-specific characteristics as well as the level of short selling pressure induced by 
convertible bond arbitrageurs.  
JEL classification: G21; G14; G18 
Keywords: Convertible bond announcement effect, financials, regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2007-09 global financial crisis has led to extensive regulations on financial institutions, 
as witnessed by for example, the passage of Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 in the U.S., and the 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 in the U.K. The economic regulation of 
banking is justified by the existence of market failure (Neal, 1997), which stems from the 
problem of information asymmetry and the risk of third party losses due to systematic 
instability (Thomson and Abbott, 2001).  However, arguments suggesting as well as casting 
doubt on the net benefit of regulation are still in hot debate and the extant empirical evidence 
is largely mixed (for insightful reviews, see Healy and Palepu, 2001; Shleifer, 2005; Zingales, 
2009).          
            Along with this debate is that any marginal benefits of financial institutions regulation 
may have been outweighed by other developments in the financial market. Among such 
developments there is deterioration in the level of trust between investors and financial 
institutions in response to the bankers’ perceived greed and bad judgment during the 2007-09 
financial crisis. This erosion of trust significantly impacted the financial institutions 
especially after the Lehman Brother’s collapse.  
           Against this backdrop, we study how stock market would react to the announcement of 
convertible bond issuance in highly regulated financial industry compared to less regulated 
non-financial industries. Because convertible bond can be structured to mitigate several 
different combinations of debt- and equity-related costs of external finance, an empirical 
examination of average valuation effects for the full issuer universe is likely to be 
uninformative. Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
document that investor reactions to the announcement of convertible bond offerings are 
negative on average, however, these studies ignore the heterogeneity between industries, and 
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in particular, they exclude financial institutions from their samples due to the special 
regulation status of financial institutions.   
         Our paper is also motivated by the suggestion made in Dutordoir et al.’s (2013) survey 
on convertible bond that “another limitation is that empirical studies tend to focus on 
convertibles issued by non-financial corporations. Financial firms are often excluded from 
research samples, as is common in corporate finance research. Financials account for a 
substantial portion of US hybrid securities issuance…It would be interesting to examine 
whether these firms’ choice for convertible securities is merely driven by regulatory 
concerns…” This study intends to fill this gap and contribute to the literature by exploring the 
research question whether the share price reaction to convertible bond offerings made by 
financials is significantly different from that of non-financial firms. We hypothesize that the 
more stringent regulation faced by financial institutions have strengthened market’s 
perception that, compare to their non-financial counterparts, the issuance of convertible bond 
by financials is less likely to signal information that their stock is overvalued, and hence the 
stock market reactions to the convertible bond issuance announcement is less negative for 
financials than non-financials. 
 We collect convertible bond issuance data between January 1982 and December 2013 
and compare the share price reaction of convertible bond issuance for U.S. financials in 
comparison to counterpart U.S. non-financials. Our findings support our hypothesis that the 
cumulated abnormal return (CAR) for financials is less negative than the counterpart non-
financials. The cumulative abnormal return over the three day period (-1,1) around the 
issuance for financials is -1.31 percent, that’s 1.41 percentage points higher than non-
financial firms and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Our 
findings are robust after controlling for a number of firm-, issue- and market-specific 
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characteristics, as well as alternative estimation method.  
          The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant 
literature, Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
Since the recent 2007-2009 global financial crisis, convertible bonds have become 
increasingly popular for firms to raise capital.
 2
 Several theories suggest that convertible bond 
can mitigate a variety of debt- and equity-related costs of external finance, including asset 
substitution problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); financial distress and asymmetric 
information problems (Stein, 1992); risk uncertainty (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988); and 
overinvestment problem (Mayers, 1998). Hence, convertible bond might become an attractive 
middle ground between equity and debt. This is particularly true for financial institutions 
given that the whole financial industry faced serious financial constraints while at the same 
time being subject to stringent capital regulation during the crisis period. For example, during 
2009 and 2010, Baylake Corp., a large U.S commercial bank, issued convertible notes five 
times with the total amount of $9.45 million.  
        Prior studies studying the share price reaction of a convertible bond offering generally 
focus on non-financial institutions. In the meta-analysis of wealth effects of convertible bond 
offerings by Abdul Rahim et al. (2012), most studies in their samples either eliminate 
financial institutions because they have different considerations when choosing capital 
structure compared to non-financial institutions or include financial institutions without 
                                                          
2
 It is shown for example in an article published on Financial Times on 10th March, 2011, titled ‘Appetite for 
convertible bonds rises’. 
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differentiating them from the non-financials. Studies in general have found that non-
financials experience significant negative abnormal stock returns (e.g., Abhyankar and 
Dunning, 1999; Ammann et al., 2006; Burlacu, 2000; De Jong et al., 2011; Duca et al., 2012; 
Murphy et al. 1997). The negative share price reaction has been commonly explained by 
theoretical models of asymmetric information as developed by Miller and Rock (1985) and of 
adverse selection as developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). According to these models, 
when a company issues risky securities, investors require a discount on share asymmetry 
between firm managers and investors.  
        Financial institutions, i.e., commercial banks, investment banks, brokers and insurance 
firms, among others, face stringent government regulation, which limit managers’ ability to 
take advantage of the information asymmetry between the issuers and investors. Some 
financial firms may focus one activity (e.g., lending loans), but it is also common for 
financials to engage in a number of market activities such as securities market activities (e.g., 
brokering), insurance, and real estate activities. We argue that the existence of regulation may 
thus have significant impact on the market perceptions on the valuation of financials which 
issue convertible bonds. The disclosure requirement in general tends to mitigate opaqueness.
 3
 
Government monitors financials to provide detailed financial information reported to public 
investors, and check the accuracy of the report. Formal enforcement actions for the 
publication of the financial report directed at individual financial institution have been 
                                                          
3
 Theory also suggests that financials may be more opaque than non-financials (Haggard and Howe, 2012; 
Iannotta, 2007; Morgan, 2002) and therefore may have higher information asymmetry than their non-financial 
counterparts. Financials’ risks taken in the process of intermediation is difficult to observe from outsiders and 
therefore the inherent complexity of financials and the nature of the underlying assets make them opaque (Jones 
et al., 2012). Slovin et al. (1991) suggest that although there is a disclosure requirement, the characteristics of 
the information structure of financial operations limit the market’s access to information needed to assess 
individual financial value and risk, which make financials more opaque. The recent 2008-09 financial crisis has 
witnessed severe dislocation in the interbank funding market (Flannery et al., 2012), which to some extent 
reflect uncertainty about counterparty solvency or financial opacity (Heider and Hoerova, 2009). However, the 
empirical evidence of financial opacity compared to that of non-financials is mixed and there is no consensus 
among researchers (Morgan 2002, Iannotta 2006, Flannery et al 2004). 
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publicly available since 1989. Investors should be able to receive more information on 
financial conditions and quickly impound this information into their stock and bond prices for 
an effective market discipline (Flannery et al., 2004). This disclosure requirement limits 
financial institution’s incentive to take on excessive risks and improve the quality of 
information in the marketplace so that investors can make informed decisions (Mishkin and 
Eakins, 2012). The disclosure requirements may also induce better bank management, 
causing a positive relation between transparency and bank profit efficiency (Akhigbe et al., 
2013). Since financials face more stringent regulation, they may be less able to take 
advantage of differential information between the issuers and investors, and hence the market 
is less likely to assume that the issuance of convertible bond by financials signals information 
that their stocks are overvalued.
 
Hence, we hypothesise that convertible bond offerings by 
financials have less negative cumulative abnormal returns than those offered by non-
financials. 
 Empirical evidence addressing the difference of stock price reactions upon convertible 
bond offerings among different industries is rather limited. To the authors’ best knowledge, 
Janjigian (1987) and De Jong et al. (2012) are the only other two studies that report the share 
price reactions on convertible bond offerings in firms within alternative industries, including 
financial firms. However, neither study provides any explanation of the difference between 
financials and non-financials. Other studies compare the differences of stock market reactions 
upon convertible bond offerings among different industries find mixed results. For example 
Suchard (2007) finds that convertible bond issues by Australian industrial firms are 
associated with more negative abnormal return than resource firms (mineral and energy 
sectors), while Abdul Rahim et al. (2012) find no significant difference between industrial 
and non-industrial companies in their meta-analysis. 
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          A number of studies have shown earlier that regulation impacts investor decisions. 
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) and Eleswarapu et al. (2004) report that with the introduction of 
the Regulation Fair Disclosure in October 2000, there has been an improvement on market 
liquidity and a decrease in information asymmetry. In particular they report that institutional 
trading before earnings announcement reduced significantly and retail investor participation 
increased after the announcement. Findlay and Mathew (2006) also show that the 
introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure and its requirement for companies to publicly 
disseminate information has improved analysts’ forecast accuracy. Grout and Zalewska (2006) 
report that regulation impacts market risk as proxied by the single-factor model and the Fama 
and French three-factor model. Polonchek et al. (1989) empirically support that due to 
stringent bank regulation, banks experience higher announcement returns of equity issues 
than counterpart non-financials. 
          An increasing number of regulations have been introduced to financial institutions in 
the U.S. that may have an impact on the market’s perception on the valuation of convertible 
bonds by financials. In December 1991, the U.S. Congress passed Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), with the prompt corrective action (PCA) provisions 
becoming effective in December 1992. PCA mandates progressive penalties against banks 
that exhibit progressively deteriorating capital ratios, which provides incentives for banks to 
address problems while they are still small enough to be manageable.
4
 In 1992, the Accord of 
Capital Adequacy (Basel I) was enforced by law in the G-10 countries. Under the Accord, 
banks were required to hold a backing for weighted assets of no less than 8% total capital and 
at least 4% of tier 1, or core, capital. These capital requirements induce banks to take more 
                                                          
4
 Those banks fail to meet capital requirements are required by FDIC to submit a capital restoration plan. FDIC 
also restricts these banks’ asset growth, and seeks regulatory approval to open new branches or develop new 
lines of business. Banks those are so undercapitalized as to have equity capital that amounts to less than 2% of 
assets will be closed down by FDIC (Mishkin and Eakins, 2012). 
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prudent portfolio or at least the investors perceive banks to do so (Rochet, 1992).
5
 Banks are 
forced to have more of their own capital at risk so that they internalize the inefficiency of 
gambling (Hellmann et al., 2001).  
          In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act further 
established the conditions for the removal of restrictions on interstate banking and branching 
in US. Under certain circumstances, banks are allowed to acquire banks or set up branches in 
other states without creating a separate subsidiary. Stiroh and Strahan (2003) argue that the 
passage of Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act created a more 
competitive environment by allowing banks to enter new markets and threaten incumbent 
banks. The increased competition through a threat of entry encourages voluntary disclosure 
from the incumbent banks, particularly unfavourable information, since entry takes place 
only if the prospect is favourable (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). Barakat and Hussainey 
(2013) also suggest that increased competition could lead to increased incentives for bank to 
enhance the quality of risk disclosures in order to get better access to external finance and 
supports its reputation from the perspectives of customers and potential investors.  
          The recent adoption of Basel II and III by the Federal Banking agency and the passage 
of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 introduced more 
stringent regulation on capital adequacy and information disclosure, as well as consumer 
protection, which may lead to decreased level of adverse selection costs for financial 
institutions’ security sales. Pasiouras et al. (2009) report that the introduction of Basel II 
increased both cost and profit efficiency of banks from 113 countries.  Hoque (2013) find that 
banks in countries with higher restrictions on higher tier 1 capital are less risky.  
                                                          
5
 The U.S. implementation of Basel II has been much slower than the implementation of Basel I. The federal 
banking agencies did not adopt a final regulation applying Basel II to banks in the U.S. until late 2007, and the 
regulation did not become effective until 1 April 2008. 
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          In the wake of the crisis, the “shadow-banking system” or non-banks have also 
received a great deal of attention and a subsequent regulation response. The Financial 
Stability Board issued three documents for consultation in November 2012, which includes 
an integrated overview of policy recommendations, a policy framework for oversight and 
regulation of shadow-banking entities, and a policy framework addressing risks in securities 
lending and repos. The principle proposal recommends central clearing of repos, curbs on 
rehypothecation, more stringent collateral valuation, and better liquidity management (White, 
2013).  
          The principal regulation changes of the insurance industry in recent years has been the 
implementation of the Insurance Core Principles (ICP) promulgated by the International 
Assocation of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) in 2011, where 26 principles are laid out to 
ensure the insurance sector is financially sound and that there is an adequate level of 
policyholder protection.
6
 The Federal Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the U.S. has 
also identified three systemically risky non-bank companies: AIG, General Electric Capital 
Corporation, and Prudential Financial, which are subjected to the supervision by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and to enhanced prudential standards.
7
 
          Overall, the above mentioned regulation changes have strengthened market’s 
perception that, compare to their non-financial counterparts, the issuance of convertible bond 
by financials is less likely to signal information that their stock is overvalued. The regulation 
changes mentioned above is a subset of changes that have taken place for financials over the 
previous three decades and the introduction of regulations may overlap. For these reasons, we 
do not isolate particular regulation changes to test the difference on stock market reactions 
                                                          
6
 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, “Insurance and Financial Stability”, November 2011.  
7
 Financial Services, KPMG, “Evolving Insurnace Regulation”, March 2014. 
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upon convertible bond announcement between financials and non-financials, but rather 
compare financials and non-financials over the full sample period.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
We obtain data of U.S. convertible bond issuances between January 1982 and 
December 2013 from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global New Issues database. 
Data are restricted after 1982 in line with SDC’s coverage. Consistent with other studies (e.g., 
Duca et al., 2012), we only include plain vanilla convertible bonds and multiple issues of 
convertible bonds by the same firm, on the same date, are consolidated. We compare 
issuances between financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and non-financials. The dataset consists 
of 2,567 convertible issues out of which 317 are by financials and the remaining 2,250 by 
non-financials. Share price and financial data are collected from DataStream. 
We follow a conventional event study analysis to estimate the share price reaction on 
convertible bond offerings. We use the market model to estimate excess returns. The period 
between -250 and -10 days before the announcement date (day 0) is used to estimate the 
parameters of the model and S&P 500 proxies the market. We estimate the cumulative excess 
returns on the day interval period between -1 and +1 to estimate the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) on convertible bond offerings. The incorporation of a day before to a day after 
the announcement is commonly used to measure announcement returns since rumors may be 
available before the announcement and there may be a lag to respond due to late of the day 
dissemination of information.  
          Appendix I provides the detailed definition of the variables used in the study. All firm- 
and macroeconomics-specific characteristics included in the regression analysis are measured 
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at the fiscal year-end preceding the convertible bond announcement date. We control for the 
following firm-, issue- and market-characteristics:  
          Ln(Total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy of firm size. Studies 
(e.g., Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999) suggest that larger firms are likely to have a lower level 
of information asymmetry, since larger firms are more likely to have greater analyst coverage 
and to undergo greater scrutiny by institutional investors. However Lewis et al. (2003) 
suggest that smaller firms face higher equity-related financing costs and the security issue 
follows a substantial increase in firm’s stock price, indicating that small firms may benefit 
more from convertible bond issues. Hence, we do not have a clear expectation for the relation 
between firm size and stock abnormal return. 
          Proceeds is the relative size of the convertible bond offering divided by total assets. 
Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007) suggest that larger size offerings may induce higher 
external financing costs and a more negative offering impact on abnormal return. Mikkelson 
and Partch (1986), Jen et al. (1997) and Lewis et al. (1999) also provide empirical evidence 
that the issue size is negatively related to stock abnormal return. We therefore expect a 
negative relation between proceeds and stock abnormal return. 
          Equity/Total assets is a measure of a firm’s equity level. Firms with lower equity level 
are considered more risky and face higher costs of potential financial distress. Stein (1992) 
suggests that firms may issue convertible securities as an indirect method to increase the 
equity in their capital structures thereby reducing the adverse selection costs associated with 
pure equity issues. Firms with lower equity level should therefore benefit more from 
convertible issues. We hence expect a negative relation between the abnormal returns and 
equity level. 
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         Maturity captures the time between the issue date and the date on which the issue is 
allowed be converted to the shares of common stock in the issuing company or cash of equal 
value, at the agreed-upon price. Studies (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; Datta et al., 2000) suggest 
that firms with better performance have incentive to issue convertible bond with longer 
maturity to postpone the conversion. We therefore expect a positive relation between 
maturity and abnormal returns 
          Stock run-up is used to proxy the level of equity-related financing costs faced by the 
convertible bond issuers and measured as the continuously-compounded non-market-adjusted 
daily stock return over trading days between -60 and -2. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007) 
suggest that a firm with high stock run-up is more likely to be seen as overvalued by 
stockholders. Lewis et al. (2003) also find that firms with high pre-issue stock run-up and 
high-risk firms are more likely to issue equity-like convertibles to reduce equity-related 
financing costs. We therefore expect that the relation between pre-issue stock run-up and 
abnormal return associated with convertible bonds offering is negative. 
          Stock volatility is the annualized stock return volatility measuring firm’s riskiness 
calculated from daily returns over the day interval from -250 to -10 relative to the convertible 
bond issue date. Since firms with high operational risk are expected to have a large expected 
cost of financial distress (Chang et al., 2004), we expect that a firm’s volatility is negatively 
related to abnormal return associated with convertible bond offerings.  
         Rule 144A is a dummy variable to control for the effect of the Rule 144A private 
placement of convertible bonds. It equals to one for convertible bond issued in 144A market 
and zero otherwise. Rule 144A is issued in 1990 to improve the liquidity and efficiency of 
private placement market by giving more freedom to institutional investors to trade securities. 
Securities under Rule 144A do not require registration with SEC, but can be traded without 
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restriction in the secondary market among qualified institutional buyers (Brown et al., 2012). 
Livingston and Zhou (2002) suggest that investors in 144A market have lower liquidity, 
information uncertainty, and weaker legal protection. We therefore expect that convertible 
bond issued in 144A market has a negative relation with the share price reaction on the 
issuance.  
          Market run-up is a measure of overall market and economic condition and is 
measured as the continuously-compounded non-market-adjusted daily market index (S&P 
500) return over trading days between -60 and -2. We would expect that issuers tend to issue 
convertible bond after a significant accumulation of market index return in addition to stock 
return. However, Lewis et al. (2003) and Duca et al. (2012) find no significant influence of 
market run-up on convertible bond abnormal return in the U.S. market. 
          Market volatility is the annualized market stock return volatility, or the market risk, 
which is calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 index. Volatile stock market indicates 
macroeconomic deterioration, which may have negative impact on convertible bond 
abnormal return. In addition, studies (e.g., Duca et al., 2012) suggest that there is a strong 
positive correlation between market volatility and information asymmetry and we therefore 
expect that the market volatility is negatively related with returns on the announcement of 
convertible bond. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis  
4.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 1 compares the key variables used in the study for financials and non-financials. In line 
with Dutordoir and Van De Gucht (2004), Panel A of Table 1 shows that convertible bond 
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offerings for non-financials have significantly negative CAR at -2.72 percent in the day 
interval between -1 and +1. In line with our hypothesis, we find that the CAR for financials is 
-1.31 percent. The difference between financials and non-financials is 1.41 percent, which is 
both statistically and economically significant  
         We further show the statistics of the control variables. Among the most interesting 
relations, we find that financials have significant larger size than non-financials, with the 
logarithm of total assets being 6.79 and 1.92, respectively. This is not surprising given that 
financials tend to be large organizations. The proceeds to assets ratio by financials, is also 
significantly lower than that of non-financials, with being 0.01% and 0.04%, respectively. 
The lower level of proceeds ratio may to some extent reflect the significant larger size for 
financials. We also observe significant lower equity/assets ratio by financials, which is 
around 26% compare to more than 45% for non-financials.
8
 We further notice that the stock 
run-up for financials (9.91%) is significantly lower than that of non-financials (18.48%). 
Financials seem to face less financial constraints than their non-financial counterparts hence 
financials may tend to issue convertible bond when they need it, while managers of non-
financials seem to consider the timing of the issuance when their stocks are overvalued.  In 
summary, the sample banks have significantly lower proceeds/total assets ratio, equity level, 
and stock run-up, but larger total assets than their non-financial counterparts.  
   Panel B of Table 1 further shows the number of convertible bond announcements for 
financials and non-financials. There are announcements for both groups for all years, with a 
tendency the number of observation to increase after 2000. Table 2 further shows the Pearson 
correlations among our independent variables. For example, financials tend to have large total 
                                                          
8
 Please note that the leverage ratio is based on firm’s market value.  
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assets, with a lower stock run-up and stock volatility. There are relatively weak correlations 
among control variables, indicating minimum risk of multicollinearity problem.  
       Figure 1 further depicts annual abnormal returns for financials and non-financials 
separately. We find that financials tend to experience higher abnormal returns over the 
duration of the sample period with only a few exceptions. The trend analysis shows that this 
difference is not driven by any particular time period, for example, the early 2000s dot.com 
bubble, and the 2007-09 global financial crisis, etc.     
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we explore whether the less negative share price reaction on financial 
convertible bond offerings than non-financials can be explained by the firm-, market- and 
issue-specific characteristics. CAR over the day interval between -1 and +1 is used as the 
dependent variable. Table 3 shows the results of Ordinary Least Squares with White-
corrected standard errors. Column (1) includes the financial dummy variable with key control 
variables. Year dummies controlling for technology changes have been included in these 
regressions but not reported to save space. 
          We find that the financial dummy is significantly positive, showing that financials have 
higher abnormal stock returns than non-financials upon convertible bond offerings. 
Specifically, the CAR on financials is 1.452 percent higher than non-financials as is shown in 
column (1) and this difference is significant at the 1 percent level. This empirical finding 
supports our hypothesis that less negative stock abnormal return upon convertible bond 
offerings should be found for financials compare to non-financial firms.  
17 
 
         Regarding the control variables, signs and significant levels are to a large extent in line 
with our expectations. For example, larger firms in size tend to have negative impact on the 
abnormal stock return upon convertible bond offerings. Larger firm face lower equity-related 
financing costs and the security issue follows a substantial decrease in firm’s stock price, 
therefore they may benefit less than smaller firms from convertible bond issues. One 
percentage of increase in firm total assets is associated with 0.00185 (0.01*0.185) 
percentage
9
 decreases in CAR. In other words, holding other factors constant, a firm with 
twice as bigger in size as the other firm will have on average 0.185 percentages lower in CAR.  
In line with Lewis et al (2003), the stock price reacts also negatively to the convertible bond 
issuance by firms with higher stock run-ups, since these firms are more likely to be seen as 
overvalued by stockholders. Managers of non-financials seem therefore to time the issue of 
convertible bond when their firms’ stocks are significantly overvalued. We find one 
percentage of absolute increase in stock run-ups may lead to 0.014 percentage decrease in 
CAR. We also find that issues with longer maturity have better stock price reaction, because 
firms with better performance have incentive to issue convertible bond with longer maturity 
to postpone the conversion. An additional year in maturity will increase CAR by 0.02 
percentages. In line with Livingston and Zhou (2002), we find that issuers of convertible 
bonds under Rule 144A experience a negative stock reaction of the offering because investors 
in 144A market have lower liquidity, information uncertainty, and weaker legal protection. 
On average the CARs for convertible bond issued under Rule 144A is 0.717 percentages 
lower than those non-Rule 144A counterparts. Overall, the result from the univariate analysis 
holds even after adjusting for firm-, market- and issue- characteristics.  
 
                                                          
9
 Please note that all the discussion of control variables are based on column 1 in Table 3.  
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4.3 Controlling for additional variables 
We incorporate a series of robustness tests to check the validity of our prior findings. Recent 
research suggests that hedge fund arbitrage has negative impact on convertible bond offerings 
abnormal return (Arshanapalli et al., 2005; Duca et al., 2012; Loncarski et al., 2009; De Jong 
et al., 2011). To exploit under-priced convertible bond issues, convertible arbitrageurs buy 
convertible bond and short sell the underlying common stock. The short selling creates 
downward pressure on the stock price of the convertible bond issuer. While on the other hand, 
DeLong et al. (1990) argue that opacity limits informed arbitrage, the absence of which 
creates space for noise trading. If financials are more opaque than non-financial firms, 
arbitrageurs may have to bear a greater risk when hedging the security issued by them. To the 
extent that arbitrageurs are risk averse, the high risk and potential ruin from the accumulation 
of short-term losses reduce their willingness to hedge the convertible bond issued by 
financials (Jones et al., 2012). We therefore include a measure “Arbitrage” for the amount of 
arbitrage-related short selling associated with each convertible bond offering in the second 
specification in Table 3. We follow the method used by Duca et al. (2012) for the 
construction of “arbitrage” and assume that convertible bond arbitrageurs follow delta-neutral 
hedging strategy. “Arbitrage” is measured as the estimated portion of change (increase) in 
short interest around convertible bond offerings that may be attributable to the short-selling 
actions of fundamental traders. Specifically, we run a regression with the scaled change in 
monthly short interest by the number of shares outstanding as the dependent variable, and a 
group of determinants
10
 of convertible arbitrageurs’ interest, then the predicted value of this 
regression is the measure for the change in short interest caused by arbitrage-related short 
selling for that convertible bond.
 
We find that in line with Duca et al. (2012), the hedge fund 
                                                          
10
 We use the logarithm of total assets, the proceeds ratio, stock volatility, and dividend pay-outs as the 
determinants of convertible arbitrageurs’ interest. 
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involvement in convertible bond offerings generates downward price pressure, and one 
relative percentage (or 0.0001 unit) increase in arbitrage is associated with 0.006 percentages 
decrease in CAR. However, financials issued convertible bonds still have higher abnormal 
return (2.245 percent) than non-financials after controlling for arbitrage. 
11
 
            In the third specification in Table 3, we consider whether financial issued convertible 
bond have higher abnormal return because it is more “equity-like”. We hence control for 
conversion premium, the ratio between conversion price and stock price at the issue date. 
Convertible bond with lower conversion premium is more equity-like, since the probability of 
conversion should be higher (Loncarski et al., 2008).  Jen et al. (1997) use the conversion 
premium to measure how much of the convertible’s value lies initially in its equity or option 
component and find that the stock market responds less favourably to those convertible issues 
that are more equity-like. We find that conversion premium has a positive relation on the 
abnormal return associated with the convertible bond issues. One unit (or 3.7%) increase in 
conversion premium is associated with 0.01 percentages increase in CAR. Our main results 
of higher stock abnormal return upon convertible bond offerings by financials than non-
financials still hold, showing financials have higher abnormal returns by 1.320 percent after 
adjusting for conversion premium.  
        In the fourth specification in Table 3, we include the market-to-book ratio as a measure 
of growth opportunities/profitability of future investment decisions. De Jong and Veld (2001) 
argue that the asset substitution and adverse section problem could be reduced by the 
expectations in the market about the profitability of the company’s project. However, Lewis 
et al. (2003) suggest that firms with high market-to-book ratio face high financial distress 
                                                          
11
 The number of observations varies from specification 2 to 6 due to the restriction of data availability of the 
additional variables used.  
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costs, and are also likely to face significant asymmetric information problems, especially 
regarding the profitability of their future investment opportunities. Our main results hold after 
controlling for market-to-book ratio, and one percentage absolute increase in market-to-book 
ratio will increase CAR by 0.003 percentages.   
    In the fifth specification in Table 3, we include a dummy variable primary capital 
expenditure, which equals to one if the primary intended use the proceeds is for capital 
expenditure, and zero otherwise. McConnel and Muscarella (1985) argue that if managers 
follow the market value maximization rule, an announcement of an unexpected increase in 
capital expenditures should have a positive impact on the market value of the firm and vice 
versa. The positive revaluation associated with unexpected capital expenditure increases 
because the market immediately capitalizes the incremental positive NPV associated with the 
unexpected projects to be undertaken by the firm.  We find that our main results hold with 
financials having 1.463 percent higher abnormal returns after controlling for capital 
expenditure, though we do not find that the use of proceeds has a significant relation with 
convertible bond offering effect.  
          The sixth specification in Table 3 explores whether the higher announcement returns 
for financials is driven by the 2007-09 financial crisis period. We add a crisis dummy, based 
on year 2007 to 2009, and interact the crisis dummy with financial dummy. We find that the 
financial dummy remains similar at a magnitude after such control. We also find that the 
announcement return upon convertible bond offerings during the 2007-09 financial crisis is 
significantly lower than the period outside the crisis. However, the interaction between crisis 
and financial dummies is insignificant, indicating that the difference between the abnormal 
returns of financials and non-financials during the crisis is indifferent from other periods.         
21 
 
             Finally, the seventh specification explores whether our results may hold when 
estimating abnormal announcement returns within the alternative (0, 1) event window 
12
. 
Once again the financial dummy variable remains significantly positive, showing that our 
results are robust by using different event windows. The higher abnormal returns for 
financials are 1.047 percent in comparison to counterpart non-financials. 
13
   
 
4.4 Differences in CARs across different industries  
We undertake further robustness tests in relation to the differences in the CARs upon 
convertible bond offerings across industries. In Table 4 we explore whether financials 
experience less negative announcement returns in relation to individual industries across non-
financials: manufacturing, wholesale retail, services, transportation, telecommunication, 
construction, mining and utilities. We use eight industry classifications, a rather wide 
definition, to have reasonable amount of observations available per industry.
14
 In 
specification 1 where the default industry is financials, we find that the parameter coefficients 
across other industries are negative, and mostly statistical significant. These results offer 
further credence that financials experience less negative announcement returns on convertible 
bonds announcements in comparison to counterpart non-financials.  We observe, however, 
that the differences in CARs between utility and telecommunications industries and financials 
are statistically insignificant. According to Smith (1986), utility firms generally report 
smaller (or less negative) observed stock price reaction to announcement of new security 
                                                          
12
 Literature on the announcement effects of convertible bond uses (0,1) event window includes Abhyankar and 
Dunning (1999), Suchard (2007), and  Ammann et al. (2006), among others. 
 
13
 In unreported results, we have undertaken further robustness for example, when using alternative estimation 
window from -200 to -40 days, and event window (-1,0). Results remain qualitatively similar.  
14
 We exclude those industries with less than 15 observations across the whole sample period.  
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sales compare to other non-financial industries because of its higher frequency of use of 
external capital markets and the magnitude of the stock price change at the announcement 
will vary inversely with the degree of predictability of the announcement if other factors are 
held constant. Telecommunications industry has traditionally been subject to a complex 
federal and state regulation in the U.S., since telecommunications services are based on an 
increasingly sophisticated and complex network  of services that differ in distance, quality, 
amount and nature of data, etc. (Economides, 2005), and the regulation is even strengthened 
after the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
           In the second specification, we further explore whether commercial banks has higher 
convertible bond announcement returns compared to non-banks and non-financials. 
Commercial banks are monitored by both the market and the regulator and are constrained in 
terms of the timing and choice of financing (Poloncheck et al., 1989). The security issuance 
process by banks is also frequently mandated by bank regulators. Through chartering, 
proposals for new banks are screened to prevent undesirable people from controlling banks, 
therefore reduce the adverse selection problem. Regulation also limits the freedom and 
flexibility of bank managers to set the quantity of capital, to choose the type of capital, and to 
time security offerings to take advantage of differential information between the managers 
and the public (Poloncheck et al., 1989). The second estimation indeed supports empirically 
our hypothesis showing that banks experience higher announcement returns from counterpart 
non-banks and non-financials.  
              Finally, in the third specification, we drop commercial bank issued convertible bond 
offerings from our sample and re-run the regression of specification 1. The purpose of this 
specification is to compare all the other non-financial industries with the default non-banks to 
investigate whether our previous results are driven by the commercial banking industry. We 
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find that similar to specification 1, most non-financial industries have more negative 
announcement abnormal returns upon convertible bond offerings compare to the non-banks. 
    
4.5 Matched sample methodology 
We also concern the robustness of the methodology we used so far. One may argue that our 
sample between financials and non-financials are not balanced (317 vs. 2,250), and this 
imbalance may cause bias in our results. Following Flannery et al. (2012), we compare the 
CARs of financial issued and non-financial firms issued convertible bonds by matching each 
sample financials with a controlled non-financial firm on the basis of important 
characteristics as a robustness test. We select the firm whose size, relative size of proceeds, 
and conversion premium is closest to the financial as our non-financial control firm. These 
matches are nevertheless imperfect, so we control for these differences in the regression.  
∆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛿0 +  𝛿1 (∆ 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖
) + 𝛿2 (∆ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖) +  𝛿3 (∆ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) +
 𝛿4 (∆ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) +   𝛿5 (∆ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖) +  𝛿6 (∆ 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) +  𝜇𝑖  (1) 
Where ∆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  denotes the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  bank’s CAR less that of its control firms estimated into a 
number of bank characteristics.  
          The estimated value of 𝛿0  thus measures the mean excess CAR of financial issued 
convertible bond over its control firm, after controlling for differences in firm-, issue- and 
market- specific variable between financial and control. The regression results are reported in 
Table 5. We find that our results are robust with this alternative methodology, showing that 
financial issued convertible bond has higher abnormal return than non-financials, since after 
controlling for the differences in various characteristics, the constant term ( 𝛿0 )  is still 
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significantly positive. In particular, the constant term shows that financials have higher 
abnormal returns by 1.138 percent than non-financials.  
 
 5. Conclusions 
Previous literature focused on non-financials and generally found significantly negative stock 
price effects associated with convertible bond offerings. We focus on the difference in the 
stock market reactions to the convertible bond offerings by financials and non-financials. 
Because of the existence of the stringent regulation, financials are less able to take advantage 
of differential information between the managers and the public, and hence the market is less 
likely to assume that the issuance of convertible bond by financials signals information that is 
overvalued. We therefore hypothesize less negative share price reaction for financials that 
issue convertible bond than that of non-financial counterparts. Indeed, we find that the 
cumulative difference on abnormal return associated with convertible bond offerings for 
financials is 1.42 percent higher than the counterpart non-financials.  
          The results of our study therefore offer further evidence of the impact of regulation on 
investor decision within the convertible bond literature. A number of studies (e.g., 
Eleswarapu et al., 2004; Findlay and Mathew, 2006; Polonchek et al., 1989) have previously 
shown that regulation impacts stock market characteristics such as liquidity and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Our study offers further confirmation that regulation impacts positively on 
the stock market reaction to convertible bond announcements. Financials that are highly 
regulated experience higher stock announcement returns compared to counterpart non-
financials due to lower level of information asymmetry.     
          We focus on convertible bond announcement in the U.S. market due to its market’s 
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significance and the relatively large dataset available for financials. We believe that our 
results are potentially applicable to an international context. In line with US findings, a 
number of studies have shown that convertible bond announcement returns for non-financials 
are significantly negative for the UK (Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999), and other European 
countries (e.g., Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2009). Financials also tend to face stringent 
regulations globally (Barth et al., 2001). Regulations such as Basel I, II and III are applicable 
to financials over a large number of countries and there have been recent introductions and 
further discussions of stringent regulation since the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 
(Mullineux, 2013). For example, the creation of a Banking Union is under discussion across 
countries of European Union. The limitation of our single country analysis, however, is that it 
is difficult to quantitatively measure the financial regulation changes over time, and is hence 
unable to quantify the impact of the regulation changes on the convertible bond 
announcement effect. Future research may therefore be needed to explore the validity of our 
empirical results for financials using cross-country data. 
  
26 
 
References 
Abdul Rahim, N., Goodacre, A., Veld, C., 2014. Wealth effect of convertible bond loans 
versus warrant-bond loans: A meta analysis. The European Journal of Finance, forthcoming.  
Abhyankar, A., Dunning, A., 1999. Wealth effects of convertible bond and convertible 
preference share issues : An empirical analysis of the UK market. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 23, 1043–1065. 
Akhigbe, A., McNulty, J.E., Stevenson, B.A., 2013. How does transparency affect bank 
financial performance? International Review of Financial Analysis 29, 24-30.  
Ammann, M., Fehr, M., Seiz, R., 2006. New evidence on the announcement effect of 
convertible and exchangeable bonds. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 16, 43–
63. 
Arshanapalli, B., Fabozzi, F., Switzer, L.N., Gosselin, G., 2005. New evidence on the market 
impact of convertible bond issues in the U.S. Finance Letters 3, 1–6. 
Barakat, A., Hussainey, K., 2013. Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk 
reporting: Evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks. International 
Review of Financial Analysis 30, 254-273. 
Barth, J.R., Caprio, G., Levine, R., 2001. Banking systems around the globe: Do regulation 
and ownership affect performance and stability? National Bureau of Economic Research, 31-
96. 
Brennan, M.J., Schwartz, E.S., 1988. The case for convertibles. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 1, 55-64 
Brown, S.J., Grundy, B.D., Lewis, C.M., Verwijmeren, P., 2012. Convertibles and hedge 
funds as distributors of equity exposure. Review of Financial Studies 25, 3307–3112. 
Burlacu, R., 2000. New evidence on the pecking order hypothesis: the case of French 
convertible bonds. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 10, 439–459. 
Chang, S.-C., Chen, S.-S., Liu, Y., 2004. Why firms use convertibles: A further test of the 
sequential-financing hypothesis. Journal of Banking & Finance 28, 1163–1183. 
Chiyachantana, C.N., Jiang, C.X., Taechapiroontong, N., Wood, R.A., 2004. The impact of 
regulation Fair Disclosure on infrmation asymmetry and trading: An interday analysis. The 
Financial Review 39, 549-577. 
Darrough, M.N., Stoughton, N.M., 1990. Financial disclosure policy in an entry game. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 12, 219–243. 
Datta, S., Iskandar-datta, M., Patel, A., 2000. Some evidence on the uniqueness of initial 
public debt offerings. The Journal of Finance 55, 715–743. 
Dann, L. and Mikkelson, W., 1984, Convertible debt issuance, capital structure change and 
financing-related information: Some new evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 13,157-
186. 
27 
 
 
De Jong, A., Veld, C., 2001. An empirical analysis of incremental capital structure decisions 
under managerial entrenchment. Journal of Banking & Finance 25, 1857-1895. 
De Jong, A., Dutordoir, M., van Genuchten, N., Verwijmeren, P., 2012. Convertible arbitrage 
price pressure and short-sale constraints. Financial Analysts Journal 68, 70–88. 
DeLong, J., Shleifer, A., Summers, L., Waldman, R., 1990. Noise trader risk in financial 
markets. Journal of Political Economy 98, 703–738. 
Duca, E., Dutordoir, M., Veld, C., Verwijmeren, P., 2012. Why are convertible bond 
announcements associated with increasingly negative issuer stock returns? An arbitrage-
based explanation. Journal of Banking & Finance 36, 2884–2899. 
Dutordoir, M., Van De Gucht, L.M., 2004. Are European convertibles more debt-like than 
the US issues? An empirical analysis. Review of Business and Economics 49, 533–568. 
Dutordoir, M., Van de Gucht, L.M., 2007. Are there windows of opportunity for convertible 
debt issuance? Evidence for Western Europe. Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 2828–2846. 
Dutordoir, M., Van de Gucht, L.M., 2009. Why do western European firms issue convertibles 
instead of straight debt or equity? European Financial Management 15, 563-583. 
Dutordoir, M., Lewis, C., Seward, J., and Veld, C., 2013. What we do and do not know about 
convertible bond financing. Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming.  
Easterbrook, F.H., 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. The American 
Economic Review 74, 650–659. 
Eckbo, B.E., 1986, Information asymmetries and valuation effects of corporate debt offerings, 
Journal of Financial Economics 15, 119-152.  
Economides, N.,. 2005. Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction. The Limits and 
Complexity of Organizations. Ed. Richard R. Nelson. New York: Russell Sage Foundation 
Press, 2005. 48-76 
Eleswarapu, V., Thompson, R., Venkatamaran, K., 2004. The impact of regulation fair 
disclosure: Trading costs and information asymmetry. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 39, 209-225. 
Findlay, S., Mathew, P., 2006. An examination of the differential impact of regulation FD on 
analysts’ forecats accuracy. The Financial Review 41, 9-31. 
Flannery, M.J., Kwan, S.H., Nimalendran, M., 2004. Market evidence on the opaqueness of 
banking firms’ assets. Journal of Financial Economics 71, 419–460. 
Flannery, M.J., Kwan, S.H., Nimalendran, M., 2012. The 2007-09 Financial Crisis and Bank 
Opaqueness. Journal of Financial Intermediation 22, 55–84. 
Grout, P., Zalewska, A., 2006. The impact of regulation on market risk. Journal of Financial 
Economics 80, 149-184. 
28 
 
Haggard, K.S., Howe, J.S., 2012. Are banks opaque ? International Review of Accounting 
Banking, and Finance 4, 51–72. 
Healy, P., and K. Palepu, 2001. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the 
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 31, 405-440. 
Heider, F., Hoerova, M., 2009. Interbank lending, credit-risk premia and collateral. 
International Journal of Central Banking 5, 5–43. 
Hellmann, T.F., Murdock, K.C., Stiglitz, J.E., 2001. Liberalization , moral hazard in banking , 
and prudential regulation : are capital requirements enough ? American Economic Review 90, 
147–165. 
Hoque, H., 2013. From the credit crisis to the sovereign debt crisis: Determinants of share 
price performance of global bank. International Review of Financial Analysis 30, 334-350. 
Iannotta, G., 2007. Testing for opaqueness in the European banking industry: evidence from 
bond credit ratings. Journal of Financial Services Research 30, 287–309. 
Janjigian, V., 1987. The leverage changing consequences of convertible debt financing. 
Financial Management 16, 15–21. 
Jen, F.C., Choi, D., Lee, S.-H., 1997. Some new evidence on why companies use convertible 
bonds. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 10, 44–53. 
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360 
Jones, J.S., Lee, W.Y., Yeager, T.J., 2012. Opaque banks, price discovery, and financial 
instability. Journal of Financial Intermediation 21, 383–408. 
Lewis, C.M., Rogalski, R.J., Seward, J.K., 1999. Is convertible debt a substitute for straight 
debt or for common equity ? Financial Management 28, 5–27. 
Lewis, C.M., Rogalski, R.J., Seward, J.K., 2003. Industry conditions, growth opportunities 
and market reactions to convertible debt financing decisions. Journal of Banking & Finance 
27, 153–181. 
Livingston, M., Zhou, L., 2002. The impact of rule 144a debt offerings upon bond yields and 
underwriter fees. Financial Management 31, 5–27. 
Loncarski, I., Ter Horst, J., Veld, C., 2008. Why do companies issue convertible bond loans ? 
An empirical analysis for the Canadian market. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 
236, 214–237. 
Loncarski, I., Ter Horst, J., Veld, C., 2009. The rise and demise of the convertible arbitrage 
strategy. Financial Analysts Journal. 65, 35-50. 
Mayers, D., 1998. Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real 
investment options. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 83–102. 
29 
 
McConnel, J., Muscarella, C., 1985. Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market 
value of the firm.  Journal of Financial Economics 14, 395-422. 
Mikkelson, W.H., Partch, M.M., 1986. Valuation effects of security offerings and the 
issuance process. Journal of Financial Economics 15, 31–60. 
Miller, M.H., Rock, K., 1985.  Dividend policy under asymmetric information. The Journal 
of Finance 40, 1031-1051. 
Mishkin, F.S. and Eakins, S.G., 2012. Financial markets and institutions. 7th edition. Essex: 
Pearson. 
Morgan, D.P., 2002. Rating banks : Risk and uncertainty in an opaque Industry. The 
American EconomicReview 874–888. 
Mullineux, A., 2013. Banking for the public good. International Review of Financial 
Analysis (forthcoming). 
Murphy, A., Kleimain, R., Nathan, K., 1997. The value of convertible preferred stock in 
transactions with “relationship investors” like Warren Buffett. International Review of 
Financial Analysis 6, 241-256. 
Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187–221. 
Neal, P. (1997). The Wallis Inquiry: financial regulation and systemic instability. Economic 
Papers, 16 (2), 19-27. 
Pasiouras, F., Tanna, S., Zopounidis, C., 2009. The impact of banking regulations on banks’ 
cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence. International Review of Financial 
Analysis 18, 294-302. 
Poloncheck, J., Slovin, M.B., Sushka, M.E., 1989. Vaulation effect of commercial bank 
securities offerings. Journal of Banking & Finance 13, 443–461. 
Rochet, J.C., 1992. Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks. European 
Economic Review 36, 1137–1170. 
Shleifer, A., 2005. Understanding Regulation. European Financial Management 11, 439–451. 
Slovin, M.B., Sushka, M.E., Polonchek, J. a., 1991. The information content of multiple 
seasoned common stock offerings by bank holding companies. Journal of Banking & Finance 
15, 633–646. 
Smith, C.W. 1986. Investment banking and the capital acquision process. Journal of Financial 
Economics 15, 3-29. 
Stein, J.C., 1992. Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing. Journal of Financial 
Economics 32, 3–21. 
Stiroh, K.J., Strahan, P.E., 2003. Competitive dynamics of deregulation : Evidence from U . 
S . banking. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35, 801–828. 
30 
 
Suchard, J., 2007. The impact of rights issues of convertible debt in Australian markets. 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management 17, 187–202. 
Thomson, D., Abbott, M., 2001. Banking regulation and market forces in Australia. 
International Review of Financial Analysis 10, 69-86. 
White,W.R., 2013. The prudential regulation of financial institutions: Why regulatory 
responses to the crisis might not prove sufficient. The School of Public Policy 6, 1-47. 
Zingales, L., 2009. The future of securities regulation. Journal of Accounting Research 47 
(2),391-425.  
 
31 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics  
    Panel A: Overall statistics 
        Financial firms  Non-financial firms 
(2)vs(5) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median 
CAR 317 -1.31 -1.09 2250 -2.72 -2.6 1.41*** 
Total assets 317 6.79 1.94 2250 1.92 0.36 4.87*** 
Proceeds 317 0.01 0.01 2250 0.04 0.02 -0.03*** 
Equity/Total assets 317 26.15 20.24 2250 44.75 45.75 -18.60*** 
Maturity 317 17.95 15.22 2250 15.82 7.15 2.13* 
Stock run-up 317 9.91 7.65 2250 18.48 13.19 -8.57*** 
Market run-up 317 44.41 32.21 2250 67.86 52.51 -23.45 
Stock volatility 317 16.45 13.17 2250 16.96 14.41 -0.51*** 
Market volatility 317 4.62 4.93 2250 4.21 4.74 0.41 
Arbitrage 77 0.01 0.01 789 0.01 0.01 0*** 
Conversion premium 261 27.08 24.00 1701 30.65 25 -3.57* 
Market-to-book 299 1.05 1.30 2142 3.41 1.95 -2.36 
 
 
 
Panel B: Number of observations (Yearly) 
Financial firms   Non-financial firms 
1982 4 1998 5 
 
1982 22 1998 47 
1983 7 1999 4 
 
1983 27 1999 34 
1984 8 2000 3 
 
1984 17 2000 93 
1985 13 2001 10 
 
1985 54 2001 158 
1986 12 2002 10 
 
1986 68 2002 94 
1987 7 2003 14 
 
1987 70 2003 211 
1988 4 2004 20 
 
1988 24 2004 143 
1989 2 2005 15 
 
1989 22 2005 89 
1990 1 2006 16 
 
1990 20 2006 111 
1991 4 2007 24 
 
1991 33 2007 117 
1992 6 2008 14 
 
1992 47 2008 65 
1993 12 2009 25 
 
1993 41 2009 85 
1994 1 2010 18 
 
1994 15 2010 49 
1995 4 2011 4 
 
1995 27 2011 55 
1996 13 2012 13 
 
1996 85 2012 106 
1997 13 2013 11  1997 114 2013 107 
Panel A of this table provides the summary statistics and t-test for the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and firm-
specific, issue-specific and macroeconomic variables of financial and non-financial firms over the sample period 
January 1982 to December 2013. Variables are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. CAR is calculated using standard 
event study methodology. We use student t-test to examine the differences the mean value of CAR and each firm-, 
issue-, and market-specific characteristic between financial and non-financial firms. Obs denotes the number of 
observations. * significance of the t-test statistic at 10% level.** significance of the t-test statistic at 5% level.*** 
significance of the t-test statistic at 1% level. Panel B of this table reports the number of observations for both 
financial and non-financial institutions each year across the sample period.  
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
  Financial lnTA Proceeds 
Equity/Total 
assets Maturity 
Stock 
run-up 
Stock 
volatility Rule144a 
Market 
volatility 
Market 
run-up Arbitrage 
Conversion 
premium 
Market-
to-book 
Primary 
capital 
expenditure 
Financial 1 
             
lnTA 0.3199* 1 
            
Proceeds -0.0420* -0.1783* 1 
           
Equit/Total assets -0.2856* -0.1290* 0.0330* 1 
          
Maturity 0.0609* -0.0523* -0.0206 -0.0641* 1 
         
Stock run-up -0.0693* -0.1572* -0.0025 -0.0265 -0.0319 1 
        
Stock volatility -0.1438* -0.4552* 0.0465* -0.0821* -0.0053 0.3665* 1 
       
Rule144a -0.0806* 0.2579* -0.0124 0.1629* -0.1508* 0.0492* -0.1508* 1 
      
Market volatility -0.0283 -0.0073 -0.0175 -0.0299 0.0009 0.1601* 0.3752* -0.0046 1 
     
Market run-up -0.0206 0.0387* -0.015 -0.0042 -0.1122* 0.2526* -0.031 0.0355* 0.0577* 1 
    
Arbitrage 0.0937* 0.2369* -0.0992* -0.0378 0.0413 -0.4385* -0.7150* 0.0372 -0.3225* -0.0103 1 
   
Conversion premium -0.0464* -0.0339 -0.0119 0.007 -0.0474* 0.0056 0.0475* 0.0440* 0.0158 -0.0593* 0.0076 1 
  
Market-to-book -0.0068 0.0207 -0.0154 0.0325 -0.006 -0.0042 -0.002 0.0324 -0.0006 -0.0071 -0.0892* -0.0038 1 
 
Primary capital 
expenditure -0.0136 -0.0333* -0.0056 -0.0215 -0.0163 -0.005 0.0295 -0.0293 0.02 -0.0028 -0.0281 0.0492* -0.002 1 
This table provides the correlations among our variables for the full sample used in this study.  Variables are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. * significance of the t-test statistic at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Regression analysis of convertible bond abnormal returns 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Financial 1.452*** 2.245** 1.320*** 1.436*** 1.463*** 1.163*** 1.047*** 
 
(4.203) (2.438) (3.437) (3.967) (4.224) (3.282) (3.463) 
lnTA -0.185** -0.117 -0.047 -0.192** -0.179** -0.191** -0.187*** 
 
(-2.298) (-0.645) (-0.451) (-2.126) (-2.205) (-2.365) (-2.931) 
Proceeds -1.313 -2.634 3.511 -1.875 -1.292 -1.320 -1.429** 
 
(-1.416) (-0.274) (0.999) (-0.824) (-1.386) (-1.427) (-2.451) 
Equity/Total assets -0.007 -0.004 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
 
(-1.167) (-0.286) (-1.510) (-1.507) (-1.124) (-1.161) (-1.261) 
Maturity 0.020** 0.025* 0.014 0.019** 0.020** 0.020** 0.015** 
 
(2.532) (1.696) (1.039) (2.255) (2.526) (2.498) (2.186) 
Stock run-up -0.014*** -0.012 -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(-2.824) (-0.962) (-3.039) (-2.872) (-2.799) (-2.729) (-3.765) 
Stock volatility 0.006 -0.002 -0.003 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.003 
 
(1.309) (-0.189) (-0.528) (1.375) (1.343) (1.243) (0.644) 
Rule144a -0.717** -1.193** -0.536 -0.809** -0.716** -0.721** -0.655** 
 
(-2.259) (-1.977) (-1.407) (-2.496) (-2.246) (-2.271) (-2.430) 
Market volatility 0.024 -0.076 0.008 0.018 0.021 0.032 -0.019 
 
(0.447) (-0.706) (0.130) (0.329) (0.392) (0.609) (-0.420) 
Market run-up 0.058** 0.125** 0.046 0.058** 0.058** 0.057** 0.062*** 
 
(2.192) (2.274) (1.553) (2.142) (2.178) (2.156) (2.717) 
Arbitrage 
 
-61.551* 
     
  
(-1.928) 
     Conversion premium 
  
0.010* 
    
   
(1.708) 
    Market-to-book 
   
0.003* 
   
    
(1.692) 
   
Primary capital expenditure 
    
2.648 
  
     
(1.317) 
  Crisis 
     
-4.048** 
 
      
(-2.181) 
 Financial*crisis 
     
1.600 
 
      
(1.578) 
 Constant 0.524 1.135 -0.341 0.842 0.458 0.539 
 
 
(0.346) (0.201) (-0.180) (0.509) (0.300) (0.357) 
 N 2567 764 1962 2441 2555 2567 
 adj. R-sq 0.050 0.035 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.050 
 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal stock returns upon convertible bond offerings 
on a number of potential determinants. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return measured over the window (-1, 
1) relative to the announcement date, except in column (7) where the event window is (0, 1). All explanatory variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. The focus is on the ‘financial’ dummy that shows wealth effect for financials compare to non-financials. N 
denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Industry estimations 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Financial 
   
    lnTA -0.137 -0.142 -0.169* 
 
(-1.410) (-1.451) (-1.681) 
Proceeds -1.080 -1.015 -1.172 
 
(-0.310) (-0.293) (-0.334) 
Equit/Total assets 0.002 0.003 0.005 
 
(0.354) (0.411) (0.653) 
Maturity 0.022** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 
(2.571) (2.716) (2.867) 
Stock run-up -0.010* -0.009* -0.007 
 
(-1.918) (-1.863) (-1.425) 
Stock volatility 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 
(1.157) (1.108) (0.828) 
Rule144a -0.790** -0.754** -0.715** 
 
(-2.322) (-2.187) (-2.043) 
Market volatility -0.018 -0.013 0.023 
 
(-0.320) (-0.231) (0.393) 
Market run-up 0.050* 0.050* 0.050* 
 
(1.764) (1.761) (1.696) 
Nonbank 
 
-1.496** 
 
  
(-2.097) 
 Manufacturing -1.625*** -2.707*** -1.256*** 
 
(-3.844) (-3.907) (-2.764) 
Wholesaleretail -1.319*** -2.400*** -0.990* 
 
(-2.706) (-3.278) (-1.921) 
Services -1.667*** -2.754*** -1.345*** 
 
(-3.551) (-3.781) (-2.716) 
Transportation -2.710*** -3.757*** -2.255*** 
 
(-3.218) (-3.778) (-2.627) 
Telecommunication -0.771 -1.839** -0.409 
 
(-1.045) (-2.016) (-0.538) 
Construction -3.447*** -4.532*** -2.998*** 
 
(-4.002) (-4.476) (-3.411) 
Mining -1.184** -2.281*** -0.793 
 
(-1.985) (-2.775) (-1.294) 
Utility -0.729 -1.792* -0.260 
 
(-0.981) (-1.954) (-0.340) 
Constant 1.296 2.280 0.989 
 
(0.734) (1.228) (0.546) 
N 2217 2217 2128 
adj. R-sq 0.052 0.053 0.054 
This table presents the comparison analysis of the cumulative abnormal stock returns upon 
convertible bond offerings across different industries. In column (1) and (2) the default is 
financials, whereas in column (3) we exclude all convertible bonds issued by commercial 
banks and hence the default is non-banks. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
return measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the issue date. All explanatory variables 
are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 5. Matched sample analysis  
 Parameter estimate (t-value) 
Variables (1) 
∆EA 0.007 
 (0.366) 
∆stockrunup -0.034* 
 (-1.844) 
∆stockvolatility -0.012 
 (-0.954) 
∆marketvolatility -0.050 
 (-1.261) 
∆marketrunup 0.192*** 
 (3.799) 
Constant 1.138** 
 (2.372) 
N 317 
adj. R-sq 0.058 
In this table we match each financial institution with a non-financial institution based on size, relative size of 
proceeds and conversion premium. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return of financial issued 
convertible bond less that of its matched non-financial institution issued convertible bond, which is measured 
over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Constant denotes the constant term δ_0. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Figure 1 Annual covertible bond announcement returns 
 
 
This figure shows the annual cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the (-1, 1) window upon convertible bond offerings for financials and non-financials during the sample 
period from 1982 to 2013.  
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Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Classification Definition 
Ln(total assets) Firm-specific Natural logarithm of total assets denominated in US dollar 
Proceeds Issue-specific 
Relative size of the convertible bond offering, calculated as the offering proceeds 
divided by total assets 
Equity/total assets Firm-specific 
Total equity divided by total assets. It is the sum of common equity, preferred stock, 
minority interest, long-term debt, non-equity reserves and deferred tax liability in 
untaxed reserves. For insurance companies policyholders' equity is also included 
Maturity Issue-specific Convertible bond maturity, measured as of the issue date 
Stock volatility Firm-specific 
Annualized stock return volatility, calculated from daily returns over the window (-
250,-10) relative to the convertible bond announcement date 
Stock run-up Firm-specific Stock return over the window (-60,-2) relative to the announcement date 
Rule 144A Issue-specific 1 for offerings made under SEC Rule 144A, and 0 otherwise 
Market volatility Market-specific 
Annualized market return volatility, calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 
index over the window (-240,-40) relative to the convertible bond announcement date 
Market run-up Market-specific 
Return on S&P 500 index over the window (-60,-2) relative to the announcement 
date 
Financial  1 for financial firms, and 0 otherwise 
Crisis  
Dummy variable equals to 1 for convertible bond issued during year 2007 to year 
2009, and 0 otherwise 
Arbitrage Issue-specific 
We scale the change in monthly short interest by the number of shares outstanding 
measured on trading day -20 relative to the announcement date, then regress this ratio 
on potential determinates of convertible arbitrageur's interest in that particular 
convertible offering. The predicted value of this regression for each convertible bond 
issue is arbitrage demand 
Conversion Premium Issue-specific 
Conversion premium of the convertible, expressed as a percentage. It is calculated by 
dividing the conversion price by the stock price measured on trading day -5, and 
subtracting one from this ratio 
Market-to-book Issue-specific Market value divided by the book value of common equity 
Primary capital expenditure Firm-specific 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the issuer use the proceeds of the convertible bond for 
primary capital expenditure, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
